

## China's Challenge to *Pax Americana*

China has been a largely reactive international power for most of the period beginning in 1949 with the formation of the Communist state, willingly—and often skillfully—playing the pivot in the strategic competition of other states. In the 1960s and 1970s, its leaders briefly promoted a model of international order that stressed national revolution and proletarian solidarity. Yet, with that exception, the country has offered no real alternative vision of the international system for most of the past five decades. Beneath the rhetorical veneer, Chinese leaders have conducted their own foreign policy largely on the basis of the same calculations of balance of power and relative national advantage that drove the behavior of other major powers during the Cold War. Thus, Chinese foreign policy evolved during the first 50 years of the People's Republic in a context set almost entirely by others.

In the years since Beijing's 1996 missile exercise in the Taiwan Strait, however, Chinese leaders have begun to articulate a decidedly alternative vision of the underlying principles of international relations. This clarification has emerged gradually, in an ad hoc fashion, and has yet to cohere into a neatly bundled grand strategic vision. The concept is still evolving. Most importantly, it has emerged inadvertently—as a consequence of China's narrow concern with the issue of Taiwan.

U.S. strategists in particular should note just how much Chinese and U.S. views have diverged on the most fundamental organizing principles of international politics, not simply on specific issues of peace and security in Asia. Although tracing its origin to a comparatively narrow concern—Taiwan—this new, more comprehensive Chinese strategic vision touches the most es-

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stantial bread-and-butter issues of international relations: How should the international system be organized? Who should make decisions about global security? What is the appropriate role of military force? Who should decide international law? What is the meaning of globalization? What should be the role of the United Nations (UN)? Are alliances legitimate?

In nearly every significant aspect, China's emerging approach to world order is opposed to the prevailing U.S. view of international statecraft, and in nearly all cases, China's narrow preoccupation with the question of national reunification shapes its approach to the big questions of the international system. The longer the Taiwan problem persists, therefore, the more likely it is that these strategic ideas will become more systematic—and, thus, institutionalized—in Chinese foreign policy.

The Taiwan issue seems unlikely to be resolved soon. Over time, this single issue may give birth to a consistent and deeply embedded set of Chinese strategic preferences that will challenge the predominant U.S. approach to the foundation of international politics.

## **Two Roads Diverging**

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Chinese and U.S. worldviews increasingly diverge on six fundamental questions.

### **ON WHAT DOMINANT PRINCIPLE SHOULD THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM BE ORGANIZED?**

Although China was a latecomer to Westphalian nation-state diplomacy, Chinese leaders have anchored their security and diplomatic practice for the past five decades in what has been evocatively termed “hyper-sovereignty values.”<sup>1</sup> Throughout the 1990s, as U.S. foreign policy gradually discarded the notion that sovereignty is inviolable (the interventions in Panama, Haiti, and Kosovo provide three examples), China's stance on sovereignty remained rigid in rhetoric and almost always inflexible in practice. Indeed, only one case of significant compromise on principles of territorial sovereignty occurred in the history of the Chinese Communist state—a side deal to the Sino-Soviet alliance through which China grudgingly agreed to recognize Mongolian independence.

Even as China has become uncharacteristically flexible in recent years on certain aspects of political sovereignty—especially those issues tied to trade prerogatives and the World Trade Organization (WTO) regime, several areas of human rights, and issues regarding international peacekeeping—these subtleties are utterly lacking on topics concerning Taiwan.<sup>2</sup> Taiwan remains

the single issue to which China continues to subjugate any broad conceptions of grand strategy and, indeed, virtually its entire national security strategy.

Some of this rhetorical rigidity reflects a deepening conviction—shared, in many cases, with Russia, India, and perhaps even some European states such as France—that a principled stand against certain core U.S. strategic concepts will allow them to claim the moral “high ground” against the United States.<sup>3</sup> This comparatively rigid approach to sovereignty is by no means inconsistent with the largely security-oriented approach that has defined Chinese foreign policy for five decades. The United States denied Beijing the opportunity to veto Kosovo military operations by circumventing the UN entirely and conducting the operation through North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) structures. Thus, at a time when U.S. and European leaders increasingly stress the interdependencies that have eroded political and economic sovereignty, Chinese leaders stubbornly cling to orthodox principles of sovereignty that many U.S. and European observers view as antique.

Chinese leaders have begun to articulate an alternative vision of international relations.

Chinese leaders argue, first, that concern for human rights, even genocide, can never override inviolable principles of sovereignty. Nevertheless, China may be rethinking this position in the most extreme cases of genocide; Rwanda has become a subject of *ex post facto* debate among some Chinese strategists. Yet the issues of precisely how to define “genocide” and how neutrally to evaluate accusations of genocide remain uncharted territory in Chinese statecraft.

This comparative inflexibility on sovereignty questions derives from two longtime articles of Chinese diplomatic faith. First, Chinese strategists premise their analysis on the fact that the world comprises both big and small states, developed and developing countries. Because weak countries generally lack the confidence and ability to interfere in the affairs of the strong, Chinese diplomats argue that sovereignty must remain an inviolable principle to protect the weak. Second, the orthodox Chinese approach presumes that sovereignty is the last defense of developing countries. Thus, China routinely condemns the implicit (and sometimes explicit) challenges to sovereignty embedded in what its diplomats term the “Clinton/Blair doctrine” of intervention, as well as any NATO effort to formulate a new strategy that is no longer exclusively defensive. Both are viewed in Beijing as a creeping challenge to the inviolability of state sovereignty.

Undoubtedly, the United States and Europe debate rancorously about the premises of Kosovo-style interventions. The U.S. political spectrum, however,

will concede the unilateral right to violate the sovereignty of another country if it has been determined that to do so is in the U.S. national interest.

In mid-1999, the UN experience in East Timor signaled that China's orthodox view of sovereignty might be less intractable than Beijing's rhetoric would otherwise indicate. China sent observers, for example, to participate in a UN peace enforcement operation that violated what was still sovereign Indonesian territory.

Taiwan remains the single issue to which China continues to subjugate its grand strategy.

Chinese strategists have since offered two critical distinctions to justify Chinese support for the Timor operation; both preserve the orthodoxy intact. Ultimately, these strategists argue, a sovereign state—Indonesia—invited the UN force into East Timor; moreover, the operation had UN legal authorization. Thus, because the Timor operation did not violate China's mostly nonnegotiable principles of sovereignty, China could set aside its usual call for non-

interference in the internal affairs of another state. Indeed, some argue, as long as the two conditions (invitation and UN authorization) are met, China can support and perhaps even participate in such operations.

For the most part, however, China continues to regard political sovereignty as inviolable, as opposed to more broadly construed economic sovereignty, exemplified in the WTO regime. Thus, U.S. and Chinese views of sovereignty seem unlikely to converge in the period ahead, particularly if new forms of peacekeeping and peace enforcement gain impetus over the next decade.

### **WHAT RULES OF BEHAVIOR SHOULD GOVERN STATE ACTION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS?**

Chinese and U.S. approaches to world order also diverge on the rules of behavior that should govern state action. China has continued to cling to long- and often-repeated principles of nonintervention and territorial self-defense, even as the post-Cold War *Pax Americana* has rewritten those rules by promoting new rationales for intervention and the use of force.

Chinese diplomats and strategists routinely argue that the only truly "vital" interest is territorial self-defense. In this formulation, an "unprovoked" use of force against Taiwan that most Americans would, no doubt, view as aggressive is justified as a strictly defensive action involving territorial integrity. The more encompassing U.S. definition of vital interests, by contrast, ranges beyond the mere defense of homeland. Chinese strategists, therefore, argue that U.S. statements of the national interest tend to enshrine a "law

of the jungle" in international politics that violates legal norms and is conceptually distinct from questions of peacekeeping.

A recurrent theme in Chinese strategic journals is dissection of the U.S. concept of "shape, respond, and prepare," the national military strategy that calls for the United States to "shape the international environment" and "respond to the full spectrum of crises" while it "prepares for an uncertain future."<sup>4</sup> To a growing number of Chinese analysts, the phrase is important because the notion of "shaping" suggests an aggressive effort to extend U.S. interests beyond the homeland and thereby preserve U.S. hegemony.

Chinese analysts will readily concede that military means can be necessary to defend sovereignty and territorial integrity. China, therefore, can "legitimately" brandish military instruments in the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea. Unilateral actions that go beyond the defense of sovereignty, however, even under a claim that vital interests are at stake, are tantamount to aggression.

On the one hand, this view suggests that China will be loath to use force beyond the borders that it presently claims. This argument is important conceptually, given the frequency with which some analysts charge that China has the potential to develop into an "aggressive" power. It also suggests that China regards nearly every U.S. use of force as illegitimate under international law, which lays important groundwork for a widening gulf between U.S. and Chinese perceptions of the national interest, of the distinction between vital and other interests, and of the legitimacy of military action in strategic contingencies.

### **HOW SHOULD STATES ORGANIZE THEIR RELATIONS WITH ONE ANOTHER?**

China was an early enthusiast of alliance diplomacy. In 1950, it entered into a treaty of mutual defense with the Soviet Union. Later in the Cold War, when China feared both an active threat from its former Soviet ally and latent Japanese militarism, U.S. transatlantic and Asian alliances continued to serve the strategic purpose of checking Soviet expansionism and "corking the bottle" of Japanese militarism.

This enthusiasm has waned over the past three years, and Chinese analysts increasingly view alliance structures as a threat to peace and intrinsically aggressive in nature. No longer are the U.S.-Japan and NATO alliances viewed in China primarily as a means to cooperative defense. Indeed, a growing number of Chinese strategists appear willing for China to compete with Japan without the U.S. presence as a restraint. This shift can only be understood in context. Chinese foreign policy has come to view the alliance as a possible obstacle to a potential use of force against Taiwan and as "cover" for rearmament by an increasingly assertive Japan.

China regards nearly every U.S. use of force as illegitimate under international law.

Four sets of events triggered this gradual shift in the Chinese perception of U.S.–Asian alliances. First, the 1995 Nye initiative proposed new guidelines for security-related aspects of the U.S.–Japan relationship. Although the United States insists that military cooperation should be viewed as just

one component flowing from the broader political and economic relationships that it maintains with its strategic partners, Chinese diplomacy has come to stress the military aspects of such alliances, particularly the U.S.–Japan alliance, almost exclusively. As such, the Nye initiative inadvertently created new ambiguities about Japanese involvement in U.S. military operations, while feeding Chinese fears of Japanese logistical support for U.S. forces in a Taiwan contingency. Indeed, the entire Japanese security debate of the last

half of the 1990s has been viewed in Beijing largely as an effort to lift Japan's gaze from a strictly minimalist strategy of homeland defense to broader roles and responsibilities in regional security.

Second, the review and promulgation of the Nye initiative's guidelines coincidentally preceded Lee Teng-hui's post-1996 administration of Taiwan. Directly elected in 1996 by voters in the first free presidential election of Taiwan's tumultuous new democracy, Lee spent much of the 1996–1999 period laying the groundwork for an increasingly aggressive assertion of Taiwan's *de facto* independence. Inevitably, this action fed Chinese suspicion of U.S. alliances: Lee's efforts took place against the backdrop of the 1996 deployment of two U.S. carrier battle groups to the area around Taiwan and the considerable ambiguity about Japanese roles and missions under the revised guidelines.

Third, escalating tensions between North Korea and the United States and its Asian allies further exacerbated Chinese concerns. Japan's approach toward North Korea became even more confrontational than Washington's or Seoul's after the August 1998 test launch of a North Korean Taep'odong long-range missile over northern Japan.<sup>5</sup> From Beijing's perspective, subsequent close U.S.–South Korean coordination with Japan on North Korea policy indicates clearly that the United States is prepared to carry out "theater war" in joint operations with South Korean and Japanese forces.

Finally, the eastward expansion of NATO's membership was followed by the shift in NATO strategy away from purely defensive and deterrent concepts and subsequently by the Kosovo operation, launched without the backing of a UN resolution. Indeed, the shift in NATO strategy in particular reinforced Chinese perceptions that U.S. alliances in both Europe and

Asia have evolved away from original concepts of cooperative defense toward more expansive definitions of alliance roles and missions. Kosovo thereby demonstrated to Chinese strategists that the United States and its allies were prepared to circumvent the UN process and norms of international law that China views as inflexible.

China's increasing preoccupation with the evolving structure of U.S. alliances has, for this reason, centered around the view that a set of partnerships that once promoted peace by deterring Soviet expansion now contributes to strategic instability. As a military matter, Chinese analysts routinely contend that alliances, by their very nature, exist primarily to deter specific and identifiable threats. Yet if alliances require targets, then they must exist primarily to ensure the security of their members at the expense of another. Against the backdrop of the U.S.–Japan guidelines review and evolving Taiwan separatism, Chinese strategists have argued with increasing emphasis that the target of allied deterrence in the Asia–Pacific region must inevitably become China itself.

As an alternative to alliances, therefore, China has argued aggressively for “peaceful coexistence;” confidence-building measures; and, increasingly, various forms of cooperative security. This course flies squarely in the face of a U.S. strategy for the Pacific that continues to enshrine U.S.–Asian alliances as the centerpiece of a continuing U.S. military presence as well as the backbone of regional peace and stability. The United States will not willingly give up its Asian alliances. Ironically, then, the harder China has pushed against enhanced roles and missions for Japan's Self-Defense Forces, the more ambivalent Japanese views of Chinese intentions have become.

Chinese and U.S. perspectives on the role and utility of alliances continue to diverge. This difference has rapidly become a dominant feature of China's strategic debate at precisely the moment when U.S. commitment to Asian alliances has reached a new peak. As China's attitude toward alliances has grown more hostile, U.S. strategy has sought to shore up the alliance structure as the basis of U.S. policy in Asia.

### **THROUGH WHAT INTERNATIONAL STRUCTURES CAN STATES LEGITIMATELY TAKE MILITARY ACTION?**

Much of China's negative reaction to the Kosovo operation stemmed from the ease and speed with which the United States decided to bypass the UN Security Council to avoid Russian and Chinese opposition. Since the war, Chinese foreign policy has placed renewed stress on the need to revitalize UN structures, particularly Permanent-5 (P-5) coordination within the Security Council. Kosovo set a dangerous precedent for Chinese interests by sidelining the one international organization in which Beijing has sought to

make its voice heard on global security issues that transcend China's immediate strategic environment in Asia.

China's argument for increased reliance on Security Council mechanisms rests, in large part, on the view that peace and hegemony, no matter how benign, are incompatible. One nation or a handful of countries acting alone, Chinese diplomats argue, cannot preserve the peace.

In fact, China has voted in favor of many international peacekeeping efforts or, at a minimum, has chosen not to impede them. Chinese diplomats stress the need to adhere to rules of procedure, thus establishing P-5 consensus as essential to China's view of how to manage the global security environment.

This new emphasis on UN structures contains no small degree of irony. Despite China's long-standing preference for bilateral diplomacy, Chinese foreign policy in the past year has increasingly stressed the multilateralization of global decisionmaking, particularly on issues involving the use of force. Beijing argues that any intervention must be based on P-5 consensus and not on unilateral action, as in Kosovo, or through alliance structures that lack UN legal sanction. In keeping with the principles of inviolable political sovereignty and noninterference, peacekeeping, say the Chinese, and not peace enforcement should be the main focus of multinational intervention. China has also explicitly rejected most forms of "preventive diplomacy," arguing that they most often obscure the hidden hand of great-power interests.

#### **WHAT IS THE PROPER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OFFENSIVE, DEFENSIVE, AND DETERRENT WEAPONS AND STRATEGIES?**

The U.S. debate about the role of nuclear weapons has increasingly focused on the future of deterrence and the prospects for missile defense. China's voice has been among the most strident in urging a return to more conventional principles of deterrence as the basis for strategic stability. China has cast its stance largely as an effort to defend three decades of arms control, while preventing a new arms race as well as the militarization of outer space.

The specific number of national missile defense interceptors the United States ultimately seeks to deploy will, no doubt, affect the pace and tenor of a two-decade-long force modernization program that has sought to give China a more robust, solid-propelled strategic deterrent.<sup>6</sup> In public, however, Beijing has chosen to emphasize its political and symbolic, rather than narrowly technical, concerns. China has argued, for example, that the U.S. missile defense debate reflects a "Cold War mentality" premised on the belief that military superiority lies at the root of security. On the contrary, Chinese strategists argue, defense does not always produce security. Instead, Marxist dialectics suggest that every action produces a reaction. A stronger shield, therefore, will meet with the response of a sharpened sword. Any

U.S. move to abrogate the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, China has argued, would only trigger a chain reaction that would destroy decades of arms control and disarmament efforts.

Chinese debates have sought especially to tie missile defenses to the prospect for arms race behavior among some countries that the United States brands as “rogue” states. The United States, China has suggested, will succeed only in creating the very conditions against which it has sought so strenuously to defend. Offense is technically simpler than defense. Thus, more countries will succeed in developing offensive platforms and effective countermeasure technology before the United States is able to deploy defenses between 2005 and 2010.

China's objection to theater missile defense (TMD) systems has been particularly strenuous, in large part because Beijing explicitly links TMD to the possibility of dramatically enhanced U.S.–Taiwan defense cooperation, as well as to new forms of Japanese power projection. Joint U.S.–Japan TMD development, especially of naval theater-wide systems deployable to ocean-going ships, speaks directly to China's argument that the U.S.–Japan alliance has become a cover for an increasingly independent Japanese force projection capability. In addition to its narrowly technical role as a potential force multiplier, TMD threatens to revive a formal U.S.–Taiwan defense relationship that Beijing had insisted be abrogated as one of the main preconditions to the normalization of diplomatic relations with the United States in 1979. Politically, rather than purely technically, China views the prospect of Taiwan participation in TMD development as symbolic evidence of the de facto reestablishment of a U.S.–Taiwan military alliance.

Last, China has sought to reject the notion that defense is purely benign in nature—a form of “deterrence plus.” Instead, a growing number of Chinese strategists have argued that missile defense, in most variants, has strong offensive implications. Some in Beijing have largely accepted the view that lower-tier antimissile systems are purely defensive in nature. Yet they have argued with growing conviction that upper-tier interceptors may violate the convention on the nonmilitarization of outer space.

Chinese analysts increasingly view alliance structures as intrinsically aggressive.

### **HAS GLOBALIZATION FUNDAMENTALLY REMADE THE ROLE OF THE STATE?**

Chinese strategists who argue that U.S. security policy reflects the vestiges of a “Cold War mentality” obscure the degree to which U.S. economic policy increasingly seeks to lower borders. On one level, free trade and globaliza-

tion are thoroughly inconsistent with the orthodox conceptions of sovereignty and noninterference to which China continues to cling in the security realm. With its sweeping commitment to the requirements of economic restructuring under the WTO regime, however, China has reversed several decades of industrial policy that depended heavily on the very state-centric, import-substitution mechanisms that U.S. trade policy has sought so assiduously to tear down.

Chinese economic policy embraces technology and capital penetration from abroad, as well as the compromises of sovereignty that accompany entry into the WTO regime. Yet not all Chinese policymakers are so comfortable with the mantra of globalism that has become closely associated with U.S. policy during the 1990s. Like many voices of protest in Seattle and Washington, some Chinese foreign policy makers publicly fret that globalization may only leave the developing world behind. Still other Chinese

policymakers have sought to preserve important pillars of the developmental and industrial policy state, especially in China's high-technology sectors, where arbitrary state regulation remains pervasive and the government continues to nurture a deep commitment to the development of indigenous industries in software, new and special materials, and space technology.<sup>7</sup>

**Kosovo set a dangerous precedent for Chinese interests.**

In fact, the outcome of China's struggle to remake its economic structure will intersect

with the preceding five areas of its national security strategy in complex ways. A China that breaks decisively with its economic past will become a nation more deeply embedded in the global economy than at any time in its modern history. China would also shed important structural impediments that have hindered indigenous technical innovation. Even as it anchored the country in the global economy, such a shift would gradually reduce Chinese dependence on foreign technology transfers. It would also provide a stronger foundation for defense modernization than currently exists.

By contrast, a China that clings to past aspects of its industrial policy will, among other problems, remain burdened by an inefficient high-technology sector capable only of limited indigenous breakthroughs, leaving intact much of the system that has made China so dependent on foreign technology transfers. It would, in some ways, also represent a China that continues to look askance at its trade partners and at the process of globalization itself—viewing it largely in instrumental terms, as a means to acquire from abroad what Chinese industry cannot itself provide.

## Issue Delinkage

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Ultimately, all six of these points of divergence—the bread-and-butter of how to shape and maintain world order—trace their roots to China's growing obsession with the lingering problem of Taiwan. Reunification has become the root of China's defense planning and, in some ways, of its entire national security strategy. Thus, China insists on an orthodox approach to sovereignty on a global scale for fear of the precedent any change would set with respect to Taiwan. Most Chinese defense planners now assume U.S. military intervention will occur during a Taiwan crisis. Yet, principles of noninterference remain pivotal to Chinese policy, which insists that Taiwan's status must ultimately be determined by Chinese on both sides of the strait. China argues that the U.S.–Japan alliance has shifted its focus beyond homeland defense; any Taiwan contingency would place enormous pressure on U.S. forces forward deployed to the region, while firming up U.S. reliance on the alliance network. China's renewed emphasis on the UN Security Council stems, in part, from the deeply unsettling demonstration of unilateralism that China observed in the United States and its allies during the Kosovo crisis. TMD is intrinsically linked to the offense–defense balance in the Taiwan Strait and speaks to the evolving nature of the U.S. military commitment to Taiwan. Although China's lingering attachment to industrial policy is less clearly related to the Taiwan issue, the course China chooses as it enters the WTO will affect its technological capability, defense planning, and weapons acquisition, as well as, at a higher level, China's continuing dependence on infusions of capital and technology from across the Taiwan Strait. The Taiwan problem has no simple solution. Yet the dominant U.S. policy toward Taiwan is to call for patience, especially from the Chinese side, postponing to a still-distant future the question of Taiwan's status vis-à-vis the Chinese mainland. Clearly, such an approach has merit within the narrow context of U.S.–China relations and East Asian strategic stability.

The Taiwan problem, however, seems unlikely to be resolved soon. If this forecast is accurate, it will have important and deeper consequences for issues that lie far beyond East Asian security. Foremost among these problems is the gradual institutionalization of a Chinese strategic vision that could hamstring U.S.–China relations on a variety of important questions in international politics that will appear, at first glance, to be only marginally related to the U.S.–China relationship.

The Taiwan issue increasingly shapes China's entire approach to the big questions of international relations. The United States, therefore, should prepare for such a confrontational future. At its very best, continued divergence of core strategic concepts will produce a mixed pattern of cooperation

and rivalry over the next 5–10 years in which Chinese and U.S. leaders work feverishly, and amid considerable tension, to separate issues and prevent problems from infecting points of cooperation. Rarely have Chinese and U.S. leaders shown the necessary skill in managing their bilateral relationship, particularly in recent years.

More importantly, divergent U.S. and Chinese views of the international order could produce firmly institutionalized patterns of diplomacy in which China and the United States find themselves disagreeing on issues that are simply fundamental to great-power cooperation. On some issues of importance, China and the United States might even seek to obstruct one another's policies.

**A U.S. approach that explicitly stresses issue delinkage is required.**

This situation requires a U.S. approach that explicitly stresses issue delinkage—a painstaking and skillful effort to work through the big international issues with a Chinese leadership that views nearly every question in international relations through the prism of Taiwan. Paradoxically, U.S. policy toward China throughout the 1990s has revolved around a debate about the merits of linkage. The Clinton administration opted for linkage between trade and human rights policies in 1993, then re-

versed its approach in 1994–1995. Powerful constituencies in Congress and the U.S. public continue to support a linkage-based approach to China policy.

The problem, of course, is not that issue linkage is never appropriate, merely that it can have inadvertent—and adverse—consequences when used as a method for conducting foreign policy. China routinely links Taiwan's status to a wide variety of issues that may seem, at first glance, to have little relevance to U.S.–China relations or even to East Asia. What Europeanist in the State Department would have predicted a Chinese veto of a peacekeeping force for Macedonia?

Yet with Chinese and U.S. perspectives diverging so sharply on the fundamentals of the international system, skillful management of the relationship will require more meaningful efforts to delink the Taiwan question from issues around the globe that are of vital interest to the United States. Many such issues will seem to have little intrinsic connection to the relationship between the United States and China. To be sure, the United States can afford for the foreseeable future to ignore Chinese perspectives. Although assuaging Chinese concerns should not become the standard by which U.S. policy elsewhere is judged—in Kosovo, for example, the United States pursued its declared strategic interest over strenuous Chinese objections—such an approach will produce longer-term adverse consequences. The United

States has already begun to feel some of these consequences because of the Kosovo experience, as well as through the missile defense debate. Initially, both issues were regarded in U.S. policy discussions as only weakly connected to U.S.–China relations.

U.S. strategists have since learned otherwise, especially with respect to missile defense. China must still mature as a truly global power. Without stronger efforts to delink Taiwan from other issues, U.S. and Chinese perspectives will move further apart on the important fundamentals of international politics.

In various ways, this divergence could hamstring all aspects of the U.S.–China relationship. Chinese, Russian, and Indian perspectives on world affairs will surely move closer together. China could more aggressively employ its veto in the UN Security Council. The United States might in turn further decrease its reliance on UN mechanisms of peacemaking and peace enforcement. Ultimately, preserving U.S. flexibility might require expanded roles for alliances, and perhaps even greater U.S. unilateralism. For the United States and its allies, this would be a heavy price to pay for more aggressive coordination with China on problems in international politics that transcend U.S.–China relations and the immediate East Asian strategic environment.

## Notes

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3. "China, India Are Our Ideological Allies, Says Russia," *Hindu*, July 15, 2000.
4. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Shape, Respond, Prepare Now—A Military Strategy for a New Era," 1997 National Military Strategy.
5. Michael J. Green, "The Forgotten Player," *National Interest* (Summer 2000): 46.
6. China's solid propellant program, for example, began to receive renewed emphasis from force planners as early as 1983. Xing Qiuheng, "Zili gengsheng fazhan wo guo de guti huojian shiye [Develop our country's solid propellant rocketry through self-reliance]," in Nie Li and Huai Guomo, eds., *Huigu yu Zhanwang: Xin Zhongguo de Guofang Keji Gongye* [Retrospect and prospect: New China's defense science and technology industry] (Beijing: National Defense Industry Press, 1989), 282.
7. Evan A. Feigenbaum, "Who's Behind China's High-Technology 'Revolution': How Bomb Makers Remade Beijing's Priorities, Policies, and Institutions," *International Security* 24, no. 1 (Summer 1999): 95–126.